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Abstract 
New policy is being developed that incorporates not only innovative means of disposal, 
including the integration of source reduction and recycling, but also innovative approaches 
to funding disposal of municipal solid waste (MSW). This study was conducted to 
determine if a higher marginal price for MSW disposal affected per capita waste generation 
in New Hampshire towns, how the existence of a pay-as-you-throw (PAYT) program 
influenced per capita MSW generation, and to attempt to determine which towns were 
most likely to adopt a PAYT program in the future.  The results showed that average 
household size, existence of a capital improvement plan, and marginal price to dispose of 
waste were statistically significant influences, regardless of the variation of price in the 
PAYT program.  Towns with PAYT programs currently being implemented produce 0.18 
tons of MSW less waste per capita per year than towns without PAYT programs. 
  
Introduction 
Local governments in the rural United States are likely facing some of the most 
severe fiscal management crises in history.  Stresses caused by national and regional 
economic downturns, a steady decline in state and federal support, and antipathy toward 
the expansion of traditional revenue sources like the local property tax have all negatively 
affected local cash flows (Knight et al. 2003; McGuire and Steuerle, 2003; Reschovsky 2003).  
While much of the current fiscal crisis can be attributed to the recent economic recession, 
the current fiscal picture is particularly difficult for two reasons.  First, the rapid and 
prolonged economic expansion of the 1990s resulted in significant increases in state and 
local government revenues.  As a result, support for public programs, predominantly 
public education and corrections, increased significantly.  Second, even with increases in 
spending levels, the fiscal situation allowed for significant reductions in tax rates and 
promotion of one time refunds.  The convergence of these three factors (economic 
  1recession, increases in based funding, and tax reduction)—a “perfect storm” of fiscal 
problems--make the current fiscal picture particularly difficult. 
Attempted major tax system overhauls or tax increases in republican-governed 
states like Alabama, Nevada, South Carolina, and New York have led to public uproar and 
the threat of curtailment of major public services (Wilson, 2003; Mclaughlin, 2003).  Unlike 
the federal government, most state governments in the U.S. are required to balance their 
annual budgets, leading to difficult choices whose consequences are often felt at the local 
level.  Nonetheless, local government continues to bear the responsibility for providing 
educational services, police and fire protection, solid waste management, and much of road 
maintenance and construction services, among others.   
In the face of decreasing revenues, Deller (1998) notes that local government is 
effectively left with three major options: (1) cut back on services offered; (2) eliminate the 
service completely and allow market forces to determine if the private sector provides the 
service; or (3) find more efficient ways to provide necessary services, via consolidation or 
cooperative agreements among governments for service production.  Another option, (4) 
Aquasi-privatization,@ might be added, wherein governments continue to hold principal 
responsibility for the service provision but incorporate market-based devices such as fee for 
services in an effort to ration use.   
Lopez-de-Silanes et al. (1997) note that there are three principal determinants of 
the choice between privatization and public provision: (1) Efficiency.  There is evidence 
which suggests that private contracting can save local governments considerable 
expenses (e.g. Savas, 1987; Kemp, 1991; Johnson and Walzer, 1996).  However, in some 
  2respects efficiency may be better served by public sector provision, as social goals may 
be weighed more appropriately by government rather than private sector managers; (2) 
Political patronage.  Politicians may get political support from public sector employees; 
(3) Ideology.  This view is generally regarded as opposition to larger government.   
Comparing the three determinants of privatization (efficiency, political 
patronage, and ideology) identified by Lopez-de-Silanes et al. (1997), to the four 
methods of altering government provision of a service (cut back on services, 
privatization, cooperative agreements, and quasi-privatization) brings an interesting 
insight.  A local government’s menu of options allows it to reduce costs, even if factors 
like patronage or ideology rule out privatization or one of the other options.  For 
example, a local government that wants to reduce costs, but maintain direct control, 
could choose to cut services or adopt quasi-privatization. 
To represent this distinction in a theoretical model that follows in the spirit of 
Boyko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996) and López-de-Silanes et al. (1997), we start with the 
assumption that a local government official gets utility from having direct control over 
services,  c,  from political patronage,  p,  which comes from public employees, and from 
representing the interest of her constituents,  r.2  These constituent interests are 
themselves endogenous and depend on the degree that the official provides services 
efficiently  (eff)  and  makes decisions that are consistent with voter ideology (i).  Finally, 
the importance of constituent interests depends on fiscal stress (s).  At times of fiscal 
                                                 
2 Alternatively, this variable might represent prospects for reelection. 
  3crisis, the local official feels stronger pressure to satisfy constituents.  The local official’s 
utility function is: 
(1)   U(g) = u(c, p, r(eff, i, s)) 
This formulation allows for the possibility of tension in the local official’s maximization 
problem.  For example, if privatization is most efficient or most closely matches voter 
ideology, then the official must weigh her desire for local control against the desires of 
her constituents. 
From this simple utility framework, we break the official=s decision over a local 
service into two parts.  First, the official decides if provision of the service should be 
changed, and she then decides what form that change should take. The first step 
involves the ability of the official to match the preferences or demands of the citizenry.  
Within the public administration literature the ability of the official relates to 
effectiveness.  The second step is a purely production decision where inputs are 
transformed into outputs.  Public administrators focus on efficiency in this process.   
  With respect to the first step, the decision to implement a change, we note that 
local conditions such as voter ideology or political patronage change only slowly over 
time.  Therefore, these factors are unlikely to change the official’s optimal choice of 
service provision.  Fiscal stress changes much more rapidly, so we expect fiscal stress to 
be a strong predictor of change.  A second force for change relates to efficiency.  While 
the direct cost savings associated with implementing a new form of production 
probably stay relatively constant over time, efficiency also includes the cost of gathering 
information about different options, such as unit-based pricing for services.   
  4A theoretical justification for privatization has been widely accepted in the 
literature (Ostrom et al. 1961).  The basic tenets describe a government that becomes 
smaller and more responsive to citizen needs.  The smaller units of government 
essentially provide a multitude of service Abundles@ at differing prices and allow 
citizens to vote with their feet by moving to a location with the right mix of services.  
Others advocate privatization on the grounds that politicians cannot make strictly 
efficient decisions (Boycko et al. 1996). This theoretical context blends nicely with other 
general theories of market efficiency, and it has become increasingly popular with 
federal government.  Whether this popularity is driven by empirical evidence is 
debatable.   Lopez-de-Silanes et al. (1997) note that states with Aclean government@ laws 
and laws restricting county spending encourage privatization, while strong unions, 
particularly militant unions, tend to prevent it. 
The Case of Municipal Solid Waste Management 
 
Advances in science and technology have led to an increased awareness of the 
environmental and human health impacts of solid waste disposal. This has forced public 
managers to rethink solid waste management and policy. New policy is being developed that 
incorporates not only innovative ways of disposal, including the integration of source reduction 
and recycling, but also innovative approaches to funding this expensive service. Currently, the 
issue of solid waste disposal is one of the most complex and pressing issues in the environmental 
arena, yet often the least discussed. According to data collected by the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA, 1996) and detailed in Figure 1, waste generation has 
increased at a steady rate since 1960.  
















Historically, the policy for municipal solid waste management has been comprised of municipal-
tax funded, curb-side trash collection and a local “dump”. This kept both collection and disposal 
locally based. However, many of these local landfills have reached their capacity and closed. 
Current regulations dictate strict and expensive procedures for closing and capping local 
landfills. This is especially true in the northeast corner of the United States. As capacity in these 
states diminishes the export rate from states with less capacity to states with more capacity will 
increase and the rate of landfill space depletion will increase.  
Today’s new landfills are state of the art, modern facilities which are regionally, 
rather than locally based, and in most cases the service has moved from a municipal 
provision to a privately owned business. Communities rather than providing the 
service are now forced to buy the service of MSW management from the private sector. 
As to be expected, the private sector has not only passed the cost of the updated 
systems largely onto the consumer, but has set prices in order to maximize profits. This 
has left communities with little choice other than paying the hefty “tipping fees.”  As of 
  61994 the EPA cites national averages of tipping fees as increasing at a steady rate as is 
exemplified by Figure 2.  










In 2001 the New Hampshire Solid Waste Task Force found that only 6% of all 
solid waste management facilities in the state were under private ownership, but this 
6% took in nearly 85% of all municipal solid waste. Related was the issue of cost, which 
the task force found dependent in large part on the small number of firms in the 
industry leading to near monopoly on business. That combined with a more regional 
rather than local disposal network with longer transportation routes, a tight labor 
market and unpredictable fuel prices resulted in average tipping fees in 2000 higher 
than at any time in the past 10 years.  The task force found that one of the most 
successful programs initiated, which helps both reduce generation rates and increase 
recycling rates was the Pay-as-you-throw (PAYT) program. This program could help 
  7alter the waste generation and waste diversion amounts in order to combat the 
shrinking rate in capacity, and lessen the rising tipping fees via quelling the fear of 
costly expansions of existing facilities, exporting long distances to open facilities or 
building newer and more high tech, expensive facilities. 
Typically, municipal governments have funded local programs and services 
through taxation. Tiebout in his 1956 article on local expenditures explains that 
hypothetically the government’s job is to “ascertain the consumer’s wants for a public 
good and tax him accordingly” however a “rational consumer will underestimate his 
preferences and hope to enjoy the goods while avoiding the tax.” Because of this 
phenomenon, a consumers’ wants are estimated and combined with an “ability to pay 
principle”, to give a municipality their current budget (Tiebout, 1956, pg 417).  Locally, 
the services and programs are budgeted, approved or accepted through a town meeting 
or ballot and the tax rate is set accordingly. In this manner, each household pays a 
certain amount, a portion of which then goes toward solid waste disposal costs. This 
leaves every household with a marginal cost of zero for every additional unit of solid 
waste they produce – a system with no financial incentives for reducing the waste 
stream even when free recycling is offered.  
The PAYT Program 
In Tiebout’s model, fully mobile and educated consumers are the ingredients for 
an improved allocation of government expenditures (Tiebout, 1956).  The “Pay as You 
Throw” program, sometimes also referred to as a “Bag-and-Tag” program, provides 
this mobility.  PAYT offers consumers flexibility in their choice of the amount of service 
  8needed. The consumer in a PAYT system can choose options to affect the amount of 
waste produced and thus the amount of service requested. 
Until about 1988, only a handful of cities experimented with unit pricing for solid 
waste, when coincidently several cities across several states including Illinois, 
Pennsylvania, New York and New Jersey implemented extensive and successful 
programs (Miranda, et al. 1994). Since then the use of PAYT has grown and today more 
than 4,000 communities employ such a program (Miranda, 2002).  Miranda et al. (1994), 
in a study of 21 cities from 1990 – 1992, found significant reductions in MSW disposal at 
landfills in every town in the study. Reduction levels ranged from 17% to 74%. Most 
cities had a recycling program prior to the start of a PAYT program and all experienced 
an increase in the rate of recycling with the institution of a PAYT program.  A later 
study (Miranda and Aldy, 1998) found that in seven of the nine communities studied in 
the states of California, Michigan and Illinois, MSW waste generation decreased by 20% 
after a PAYT program was instituted, while in the remaining two communities, waste 
decreased by 50% and 38%. She found that factors influencing such a reduction 
included higher unit pricing fees, smaller container size, accompanying yard waste 
collection programs, and free recycling. Eight of the nine communities had significant 
increases in the recycling rates, ranging from 30% to a doubling in the recycling level. 
Reschovsky and Stone’s (1994) study of Tompkins County, NY found that a PAYT 
program combined with a mandatory curbside recycling program, increased recycling 
between 22-58 percent depending on the material 
  9  Geographic location also appears to affect the results of past studies regarding 
PAYT policies’ influence on MSW generation rates and recycling rates. Callan and 
Thomas (1997) conducted a study in Massachusetts in which they predicted that a 
community implementing a PAYT program would increase their recycling rate by 6.5 
percent, adding an additional 5.5 percent increase if it was a curbside pick-up recycling 
program. Seguino et. al.’s 1995 study on PAYT programs in the State of Maine 
compared 29 PAYT communities to a control group of 28 towns located at least 30 miles 
from PAYT communities to help control for illegal dumping in, or a shift in MSW to 
neighboring towns. This study found that existence of a PAYT had a statistically 
significant negative impact on per capita MSW generation; however, all other variables, 
including mandatory recycling, were not statistically significant influences on per capita 
MSW generation. Furthermore, curbside pickup had a statistically significant positive 
effect on per capita MSW generation.  
  Several studies have examined diversionary means such as illegal disposal, 
burning, or increased composting. These means of diversion in New Hampshire were 
not included in this study because of the lack of accurate state level statistics, however, 
the rural nature of this state certainly leaves illegal dumping or burning as a potential 
problem then needs further investigation.  Miranda and Bynum (2002) found that when 
she looked closer at the nine towns from her 1998 study, seven cited problems with 
illegal dumping or burning of trash. Fullerton and Kinneman (1994) conducted a 4-
week observation immediately following implementation of a PAYT program in 
  10Charlottesville NC and found that 5.33% of households disposed of garbage illegally 
and they estimated illegal disposal made up 28% of the overall reduction in MSW.  
  The second phenomenon that occurs with the implementation of PAYT is a lower 
cost of service provision resulting from a reduced waste stream. In Van Houtvan’s 1999 
study, researchers concluded that MSW was reduced by approximately 1.6 lbs. per 
household per day at a savings cost of  $0.06 per household per day.  
  Jenkins (1993) found price elasticity of demand for residential solid waste 
services to be -0.12. She estimated that in response to a $1.31 per 32-gallon price for 
PAYT, MSW will decrease by 20%, or by 183 lbs. annually per capita. Fullerton and 
Kinnaman (1994) found the price elasticity of demand for garbage disposal 
Charlottesville, Virginia to be -0.075.  Table 1 summarizes price elasticities found in 
previous studies. 
Table 1.  Survey of Price Elasticities for PAYT Programs 
Author Year  Elasticity 
Fullerton 1994  -0.075 
Kinnaman and Fullerton  2000  -0.28 
Van Houtven and Morris  1999  -0.26 
Morris and Holthausen  1994  -0.51 to -0.60 
Albrecht 1977  0.44 
 
Methods 
  This study tests three basic hypotheses.  The first is that the marginal price of a 
PAYT service is inversely related to waste generation.  To test this hypothesis the 
following equation is used: 
(2)  GenMSW = f (E, SD, PV, Price PAYT)             
  11where E are economic variables such as property taxes, SD are socio–demographic 
variables such as mean population and mean per capita income level, PV are political 
variables such as whether the town already has adopted policies or ordinances on   
mandatory recycling programs or curbside trash pick-up and (Price PAYT) is the cost of 
MSW disposal. 
  The second, model was designed to test the effect of merely the existence of a PAYT 
program on MSW generation rates. To test this hypothesis the following equation is used: 
(3)  GenMSW = f (E, SD, PV, PAYT)           
where PAYT is a dichotomous variable describing whether a town employs a PAYT 
program or not.  
  Finally, using the variables from both regression analyses, a logit model was used to 
predict a community’s likelihood of adopting a PAYT program: 
(4)  PAYT  =  f  (E,  SD,  PV)           
A review of existing literature found no consistent form used across PAYT studies. 
Researchers such as Callan (1994), Seguino (1995) and Nestor (1998) used a linear functional 
form, whereas others such as Callan (1999) and Miranda (1999) used a logarithmic functional 
form. A majority of existing literature on demand functions uses a double log form (Phlips, 
1983; Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). Although this is not a straightforward demand function 
analysis, this is a study of the demand for a service.  In this study, both linear and logarithmic 
forms are presented.  Analyses focused on the year 2000, because of the coincidence with the 
United States Census data that made an array of social and demographic data specific to 2000 
available. Thus, all towns used in this analysis had adopted the PAYT program prior to 2000.   
  12Choice of independent variables used in the estimation was based on previous 
studies.  These variables are summarized in Table 2.   
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value) 
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Percentage of the population possessing a bachelors degree 
below pov 
- / - 
4.09 
(2.38) 





Gallons of municipal solid waste per capita, 2000 
* Expected sign: (+) means this particular independent variable is anticipated to positively influence the 
dependent variables,  (-) means this particular independent variable is anticipated to negatively influence 
the dependent variables, (0) means this particular independent variable is anticipated to have no  
influence the dependent variables, (D) means this variable is used as a dependent variable.  
 
In order to give this study a more realistic non-PAYT program price the average price of 
a normal garbage bag was used for the unit price variable for towns that do not have a PAYT 
program. It was assumed that even without a PAYT program approximately half of the 
households in town purchased standard trash bags in order to dispose of their waste.  The price of 
  13a standard trash bag was obtained from Walmart. This assumption was used based on the fact 
that Walmart would have competitive prices and is widely distributed geographically around the 
state. A price of $0.375 cents per 15-gallon bag was used for the price variable in towns without 
a PAYT program.  Existence of a Master Plan (YN MP), especially one that has been in 
existence for several decades (Cat MP), may be indicative of a community at the 
forefront of municipal planning strategy, which may be more willing to adopt a new 
program such as PAYT.  Likewise, existence of a capital improvement plan (YN CIP) 
may be indicative of a community with more fiscal awareness that may know of and 
recognize the fiscal benefit of a PAYT program.  Mean per capita waste disposal rates in 
New Hampshire are 0.488 tons per person, per year. When converted to a pounds-per-
day unit this works out to 2.67 lbs. per person, per day. The number captures the 
amount of waste reported by the MSW industry in terms of tipping fees per ton. It does 
not capture the total amount of waste generated, which may include recycled and 
composted materials. This makes it hard to compare with the 4.46 lbs per person, per 
day national average cited by the EPA in 1998 (NHDES, 2000).  
Data including population, municipal tax rate, annual municipal solid waste rate, 
as well as a series of demographic and political variables were collected for all 235 
towns in New Hampshire from the State webpage.  Information on the 34 towns which 
currently employ PAYT programs, and details regarding each program including 
marginal cost to the homeowner in cents per gallon, were obtained from the State of 
New Hampshire Governor’s Recycling Program. The State of New Hampshire Revenue 
Department provided the municipal tax rates, while the State of New Hampshire 
  14Department of Environmental Services (DES) provided the annual municipal solid 
waste disposal rates in terms of tonnage per municipality. Population data were 
collected from the State of New Hampshire Office of State Planning web page.   
Unfortunately, most New Hampshire communities do not keep detailed and complete 
records of solid waste generation rates. 
  Of the 235 incorporated municipalities in New Hampshire, 186 were included in the 
analysis.  Of the 35 municipalities that had adopted PAYT programs, two had to be dropped 
because they adopted their programs in 2001 and two were dropped because they did not have 
MSW generation data for 2000. This resulted in 31 PAYT communities included in the analysis.   
Model Specification.  The analysis used both double log form and linear form.  The 
equations used in the analysis are as follows: 
(5)  Adoption of PAYT =  α + β1pop00 + β2AveSize + β3Curbside + β4MandRecy + 
β5PerCapitaInc + β6prtax00 + β1Median Age + β7Bachelors + β8Below pov + ε    
   
(6)  MSW Per Capita = α + β2AveSize + β3Curbside + β4MandRecy + 
β5PerCapitaInc + β6prtax00 + β7Median Age + β8Bachelors + β9Below pov + β11PAYT 
Price + ε               
(7)  LnMSW Per Capita = α + β2LnAveSize + β3Curbside + β4MandRecy + β5LnPerCapitaInc + 
β6Lnprtax00 + β7LnMed Age + β8LnBachelors + β9LnBelow pov + β11LnPAYT Price + ε     
   
Linear and Logarithmic PAYT program existence function: 
(8)  MSW Per Capita = α + β2AveSize + β3Curbside + β4MandRecy + β5PerCapitaInc + 
β6prtax00 + β7Median Age + β8Bachelors + β9Below pov + β10PAYT + ε              
 
(9)  LnMSW Per Capita = α + β2LnAveSize + β3Curbside + β4MandRecy + β5LnPerCapitaInc + 
β6Lnprtax00 + β7LnMed Age + β8LnBachelors + β9LnBelow pov + β10PAYT + ε             
 
where variables are as described in Table 2.   
RESULTS 
  
  15Results of the various models are shown in Tables 3 - 5. A Breusch-Pagen test 
confirmed that heteroskedacticity was a problem in the model. The final least squares 
models used White Corrected Standard Errors for calculating confidence intervals.  
In order to answer the question:  “does marginal price for waste disposal affect average 
per capita generation rates across towns?” the analysis  included average annual per capita 
municipal solid waste production as the dependent variable and marginal price per 15 gallon bag 
as one of a series of independent variables. Both towns with PAYT and towns without PAYT 
were included in this analysis. In towns without a PAYT program the estimated value for an over 
the counter generic 15-gallon trash bag, $0.0375 was used.  PAYT program prices ranged from 
$0.43 to $1.50 per 15-gallon bag. Results are shown in Table 3 with both linear and logarithmic 
forms of the equation presented.  
Table  3.  Determinants of Per Capita MSW Generation Rates, New Hampshire 
Towns.   Dependent Variable: Per Capita MSW, in Gallons 







































Price15g  -1052.55* -0.63* 
  16(582.84) (0.25) 














N  188 184 
Adjusted R2  0.08  0.05631 
Breusch-Pagen with 12 DF  166.68 12.97 
* Significant at the 90% level 
* * Significant at the 99% level 
 
Several of the variables that were significant in other studies were not 
statistically significant in our New Hampshire study.  Van Houtven (1999) found MSW 
generation was lower in higher income households in Georgia, however this study 
found that income (PerCapInc) was not a statistically significant influence. Miranda 
and Aldy (1998)  found relationships between recycling and PAYT and Callan and 
Thomas (1997) specifically focused on curbside recycling and found it a negative 
influence on MSW generation. Neither the mandatory recycling (MandRecy ) nor the 
curbside pick-up (Curbside ) variable had any statistical significance in this study.   
The coefficient for average size of the household (AVEHHSIZ), was –1325.92 and 
the coefficient for existence of a Capital Improvement Plan (YNCIP) was –-662.66. The 
coefficient for the price of a PAYT program (PRICE15g) in dollars per gallon in the 
linear form was –1052.54 and in the logarithmic form was –0.633. The results show that 
of the variables included in this study, average household size (Avehhsiz), existence of 
a capital improvement plan (YNCIP), and marginal price to dispose of waste 
(PRICE15G) were statistically significant influences, at the 90% level.   
  17The significance of household size may imply that households with more people 
tend to buy in bulk resulting in less packaging. Also, larger households may tend to 
share many “common” items such as light bulbs and newspapers, again resulting in 
less packaging.  It is difficult to tell why the existence of a Capital Improvement Plan 
(YNCIP) may have influenced generation rates. Towns that do have a Plan may exhibit 
characteristics of a more forward-thinking policy-making regimen and may be more apt 
to adopt a new program such as PAYT. The significance of the price variable suggests 
that, indeed, New Hampshire communities are vulnerable to price-effects, in that a shift 
in price will shift behavior.   
The results indicate that marginal price for MSW disposal can lower annual per capita 
MSW generation rates. A conversion factor obtained from regional waste management 
professionals (Ellis, 2003), where 15 gallons of household MSW  equals 10 pounds in weight, 
was used to relate the coefficient to pounds. Our coefficient for the linear form was –1052.54 
suggesting that a one-dollar increase in the price of disposal will lead to a decrease in annual per 
capita municipal solid waste of approximately 1052.54 gallons per year. However, a one-dollar 
increase in the price of disposal is close to a 250% increase in the average unit price of this study 
(2.9 cents per gallon). In order to apply the coefficient we took one percent of the coefficient, to 
show that a one percent of a dollar increase in the price of disposal per gallon, or 1 cent, will lead 
to a decrease in annual per capita municipal solid waste of approximately 10.53 gallons, or 7.0 
pounds average per capita per year. The average per capita MSW generation rate in NH, derived 
from our database is 0.488 tons or 976 lbs.  If we apply this to a community of 26,000 
(approximately the size of Portsmouth, NH) this would result in an overall reduction in 
household MSW of 91 tons per year, based on our conclusions.   
  18Own price elasticities of demand were calculated for the both the linear and logarithmic 
coefficients. For the linear model, own-price elasticity at mean variable values was - 0.31.   
Elasticity for the logarithmic form (as illustrated by the estimated coefficient) was - 
0.633. Thus own price elasticity of demand for waste disposal is relatively inelastic and 
comparable to those found by previous studies (Table 1).  
Examining only PAYT programs, differences in per bag prices between towns with 
PAYT had no significant effect on the generation rate of MSW between these same towns. This 
may mean that towns implementing PAYT with higher marginal prices have no less waste 
generation than towns implementing PAYT with lower marginal prices, or that the variation of 
waste generation between towns with PAYT was too small for this study to capture. To explore 
the possibility that simply the existence of a positive marginal price, or the program itself and not 
necessarily the difference between pricing amounts influenced the average per capita MSW 
generation across the sample, models were estimated using only existence of  PAYT (PAYT) as 
a dichotomous variable rather than price per gallon. The results are shown in Table 4.  
Table  4.  Determinants of MSW Generation Rates, Dependent Variable: Per Capita 
MSW, in Gallons 

























MandRecy  87.08 -0.631 
  19(247.97) (0.473) 




























N  190 186 
Adjusted R2  0.084  0.051 
Breusch-Pagen with 12 DF  174.097  15.622 
* Significant at the 90% level 
* * Significant at the 99% level 
 
This analysis yielded results very similar to the results obtained when price was 
used as an independent variable. The coefficient for existence of a PAYT program 
(PAYT) was significant at the 90% level in the linear form and at the 99% level in the 
logarithmic form.  These results indeed indicate that simply existence of a PAYT 
program has a statistically significant impact on MSW generation whereas relatively 
small price changes between PAYT programs do not. For example, according to our 
results towns with PAYT programs currently being implemented produce 532 gallons 
less waste per capita than towns that do not have the PAYT program. Using the 
conversion factor of 15 gallons equaling 10 lbs, 532 less gallons per capita equals 354.6 
pounds per capita of MSW, or 0.18 tons.   This equates to a reduction in per capita 
generation of about 37 percent, which is within the range found in other studies.   
  20  In order to predict the likelihood of a town adopting a PAYT program 
based on the variables collected for this study, a Logit model was run using PAYT as 
the dependent variable. Table 5presents the results. 
Table 5.  Factors Affecting Adoption of PAYT Program.  Dependent Variable: PAYT 
Program Existence 
Variable Maximum  Likelihood  Estimates 
($/std. Error) 
Constant  -13.06 
(0.00) 
AveHHSize  -5.34 
(-3.272)** 
 YNMP  27.23 
(0.000) 
 YNCIP  0.87 
(0.178) 
Curbside  0.45 
(0.140) 
MandRecy  -0.53 
(-0.123) 
PerCapInc  -0.69 
(-0.624) 
MedAge  -0.67 
(-0.915) 
 Bachelor  0.10 
(0.420) 
 BelowPov  -0.70 
(-0.653) 
GALPCMSW   
 N  207 
 Chi Squared (12 d.f.):  28.412 
McFadden’s R2:  0.159 
*Significant to the 90% level 
** Significant to the 95% level 
Prediction Success Table 
                        Predicted 
Actual            0            1 
      0              171          4 
      1                28          4 
Total             199          8              
  21Although three variables had coefficients statistically significant at either the 90 or 99% 
levels, average household size, (AVEHHSIZ), property tax (PrTax00) and per capita 
MSW generation (GALPCMSW),  the signs of the coefficients raised some questions. 
The coefficient for Average household size, (AVEHHSIZ) was –5.34, the coefficient for 
property tax (PrTax00) was 0.704 and the coefficient for per capita MSW generation 
(GALPCMSW) was –0.443,  According to the analysis, the larger the average household 
size in a town  the less likely that town was to adopt a PAYT program. Additionally, the  
lower the per capita waste generation rate, the more likely a town was to adopt a PAYT 
program. This raises the issue of causality. It has already shown been that  PAYT and 
average household size do, in fact, have statistically significant negative influences on  
per capita waste generation rates. This logit analysis questions whether a town with low 
per capita MSW generation rates is more likely to adopt a PAYT program or whether 
the existence of the PAYT program is the reason the per capita MSW generation rate has 
a negative coefficient . This question may be explored in follow-up studies.  
  The logit analysis results also suggest that the higher the property tax in a town the more 
likely a town may be to adopt a  PAYT program. This result suggests some sort of “fiscal stress” 
category of influence. Additional data should be gathered to more accurately define fiscal stress 
in communities and assess whether they support this result.   Overall the analysis provided little 
to no predictive power using the variables in this particular analysis.  The prediction success 
analysis shows that using the variables selected for this study, only 4 of the 31 towns 
that adopted a PAYT program could be correctly predicted.  
Policy Implications 
 
  22This study is an important step to better understand the dynamics of managing the State 
of New Hampshire’s solid waste stream. Using the variables that were collected, the analysis 
found that an increase in marginal price for solid waste disposal above and beyond the normal 
price of store bought garbage bags, and a pro-active approach to community planning, such as 
the existence of a Capital Improvement Plan reduce annual per capita waste generation. It was 
also apparent that certain characteristics in a community, such as average size of households can 
affect solid waste generation.  
Although results show that an increase in marginal price may reduce per capita 
MSW generation rates, PAYT may not be right for every town. This study presents 
results gleaned from analyses using mean annual data taken from all towns in New 
Hampshire. Each town must look at the specific characteristics and variables that may 
influence solid waste policy and make a determination based on that specific data.   
The OLS regressions showed that an increase in the price of waste disposal as 
imposed by a PAYT program had a statistically significant effect on MSW disposal 
amounts in New Hampshire towns. This decrease in MWS disposal rates may translate 
into an overall lower cost of disposal to a specific municipality as was shown in the 
example of Portsmouth at the end of Chapter 4. This is because most towns pay a 
private firm for disposal by the ton. Less tons mean less cost of disposal. However, this 
is not to say this study necessarily shows an overall decrease in cost to the town.   The 
design and implementation of a PAYT program is not without administration costs. 
Administration costs may be anything from staff time to record keeping to education 
and outreach to residents regarding program specifics. Further work needs to be done 
  23analyzing these costs. Although this study shows that implementing a PAYT program 
lowers solid waste generation rates, the overall savings will only be beneficial to the 
community if they outweigh the cost of program implementation. These cost analysis 
studies should look at all aspects of solid waste management options, such as recycling 
programs and local level composting.  
  As previously mentioned, this study shows that any increase in annual per capita disposal 
costs negatively influences annual per capita disposal rates. However the question of why or how 
disposal rates decreased was not explored.  Further research is needed to explore where the 
decrease in MSW generation originates.  Are households in towns where a PAYT program exists 
more environmentally conscious with tendencies to buy in bulk or make purchasing choices of 
items with less packaging or re-use value? Or do these communities choose to participate in the 
option of illicit dumping or burning because of the increase in cost?  
REFERENCES 
Albrecht, Oscar W. “An Evaluation of User Charges for Solid Waste Collection and 
Disposal”. Resource Recovery and Conservation, 1976/1977, Vol. 2. 
 
Boycko, M., A. Shleifer, et al. (1996). "A theory of privatization." The Economic Journal 
106(March): 309-19. 
 
Callan, Scott J. “Adopting a Unit Pricing System for Municipal Solid Waste; Policy and 
Socio-Economic Determinants”. Env. and Res. Econ., December 1999, pp 503 – 518. 
 
Deaton, A., and S. Muellbauer. Economics and Consumer Behavior. Cambridge 
University Press, NY. 1980. 
 
Deller, S. C. (1998). "Local government structure, devolution, and privatization." Review 
of Agricultural Economics 20(1): 135-154. 
 
Fullerton, D. and T. Kinnaman. “Garbage, recycling and illicit burning or dumping.” 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,  1995,  Vol. 29, Issue 1, pg. 78.  
 
  24Johnson, R.A. and N. Walzer.  (1996).  Competition for City Services: Has the Time Arrived?  
Springfield, Illinois:  Office of the Comptroller, Illinois Municipal League, Illinois 
Institute for Rural Affairs.  56 pp.  
 
Kemp, R.L. (ed.) 1991.  Privatization:  The Provision of Public Services by the Private Sector.  
Jefferson, NC:  McFarland.   
 
Kinnaman, Thomas and Don Fullerton. “Garbage and Recycling with Endogenous 
Local Policy”. Journal of Urban Economics, 2000, Vol. 48, pp. 419 – 442. 
 
Knight, B. A. Kusko and L. Rubin. (2003). AProblems and prospects for state and local 
governments.@ State Tax Notes. (August):427-439. 
 
Lopez-de-Silanes, F., A. Shleifer, and R.W. Vishny.  1997.  APrivatization in the United 
States.@  RAND Journal of Economics.  28(3): 447-471. 
 
McGuire, T.J. and C.E. Steuerle. (2003). AA summary of what we know B and don=t know 
B about state fiscal crises.@ State Tax Notes. (August):357-361. 
 
McLaughlin, A.  (2003). AAs US cuts taxes, states hike them.@  The Christian Science 
Monitor. May 28.   
 
Miranda, M.L. and D. Z. Bynum. “ Unit Based Pricing and Undesirable Diversion: 
Market Prices and Community Characteristics”. Society and Natural Resources, 2002, 
Vol. 15, pp. 1 - 15 
 
Miranda, Marie Lynn and Joseph E Aldy. “Unit pricing of residential municipal solid 
waste: lessons from nine case study communities”. Journal of Environmental 
Management, 1998, Vol. 52, pp. 79-93. 
 
Morris, G.E., and D.M. Holthausen . The Economics of Household Solid Waste 
Generation and Disposal”. J. of Environmental Econ. and Management. 1994, Vol. 26. 
 
Nestor, D.V. and M.J. Podolsky. “Assessing Incentive Based Environmental Policies for 
Reducing Household Waste Disposal”. Contemporary Economic Policy, October 1998, 
Vol. 16, Issue 4, pp. 401 – 413 
 
NHDES. “Solid Waste Report to the Legislature : NHDES Pollution Prevention 
Program, Jan. 1997 - Dec. 2000”. December 2001. WMD-01-7 (PDF) 
 
New Hampshire State Webpage. http//:www.state.nh.us , Accessed 9/10/02. 
 
  25  26
Ostrom, V., C. M. Tiebout, et al. (1961). "The organization of government in 
metropolitan areas: A theoretical inquiry." The American Political Science Review 55(4): 
831-842. 
 
Phlips, L., Applied Consumption Analysis. North Holland Publishing, NY. 1983.  
 
Reschovsky, A. (2003). AThe implication of state fiscal stress for local governments.@ 
Paper presented at The Urban Institute Conference on State Fiscal Crises: Causes, 
Consequences, and Solutions.  Washington DC. (April).  
 
Reschovsky, J.D., and S. E. Stone. “Market incentives to encourage household waste 
recycling: Paying for what you throw away.” Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management, 1994, Vol. 13, Issue 1, pp. 120-139. 
 
Savas, E.S.  1987.  Privatization:  The Key to Better Government.  Chatham, NH:  Chatham 
House Publishers. 
 
Seguino, Stephanie et al. “Solid Waste Management Options: The Economics of Variable 
Cost and Conventional Pricing Systems in Maine.” Margaret Chase Smith Center for 
Public Policy, June 1995 
 
Tiebout, C.M. “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures”. The Journal of Political 
Economy, 1956, Vol. 64, Issue 5, pp. 416-424. 
 
United States Environmental Protection Agency; Office of Solid Waste and Emergency 
Response. “Municipal Solid Waste Factbook, v. 3.0). EPA 530-C-96-001, March 1996. 
 
Van Houtvan, G.L. and  G.E. Morris. “Household Behavior Under Alternative Pay-as-
you-Throw Systems for Solid Waste Disposal”. Land Economics, November 1999, Vol. 
75, Issue 4, pp 515 – 538.  
 
Wilson, G.  (2003).  AAlabama vote roils alliances and stirs moral quandaries.@ The 
Christian Science Monitor. September 08. 